No Communal and First-Person Errors: A Critique of Brandom’s Objectivity Proof

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Abstract

Brandom recognizes one of the most serious conceptual challenges facing the pragmatic semantics advocated his Making It Explicit is the need to accommodate the objectivity conviction that our attitudes are answering to things that transcend our attitudes. And he meets the challenge head-on by processing a proof in his climactic chapter eight to demonstrate that his account does not force upon itself the undesirable consequence that \((p)[(S) (S \text{ claims that } p \rightarrow p)]\), dubbed the No Communal Error Condition. In this paper, I shall argue that Brandom's proof fails, and, moreover, I prove that both the No Communal Error Condition and what Brandom calls No First-Person Error Condition, \((p) [(I \text{ claim that } p \rightarrow p)]\), with minor modifications, will result from his pragmatic account.

Keywords: Brandom, objectivity, inferential semantics, pragmatic semantics
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In his *Making It Explicit* (1994), Robert Brandom advocates that semantic contents in general can and should be explicated by means of various structures exhibited by the social practices of *taking*, or *treating* linguistic performances as correct or incorrect. He believes these content-conferring structures ought to be *inferentially articulated*, since the content of a linguistic expression is just the proper inferential role that discursive linguistic participants take it to have in social justificatory activities.

Brandom recognizes that one of the most serious conceptual challenges facing his pragmatics is the need to accommodate the objectivity conviction that our attitudes are answering to things that transcend our attitudes, in the sense that we might be wrong about how they are. (Brandom, 1994: 137) And he meets the challenge head-on by processing a proof in his climactic chapter 8 to demonstrate that his account does not force upon itself the undesirable consequence that \((p)[(S) (S claims that p) \rightarrow p]\), dubbed the No Communal Error Condition (hereafter, NCE) (Brandom, 1994: 602). In fact, Brandom claims proudly that he is the first one ever able to offer such a proof.  

I shall argue that Brandom’s proof fails. Moreover, I prove that both NCE and what Brandom calls No First-Person Error Condition

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1 “How is it possible for our use of an expression to confer on it a content that settles that we might all be wrong about how it is correctly used, at least in some cases?” (Brandom, 1994: 137)

2 See Brandom, 1997: 200-1.
(i.e., (p) [(I claim that p) → p] (Brandom, 1994: 605)), with minor modifications, will result from his normative inferential pragmatics.

I. Brandom’s Perspectival Objectivity

Brandom’s proof of objectivity draws on his account of objectivity what he calls ‘deontic scorekeeping model’ on linguistic practice, which is meant to simultaneously clarify the ideas of perspectival content and perspectival objectivity.

The scorekeeping model is a model of the structure of the social game of giving and asking for reasons, in which, according to Brandom, what can serve as a reason is a commitment and how a commitment serves its role depends on the interlocutor’s and interpreter’s interpretations. Accordingly, the model requires that the discursively engaged interpreter must keep two sorts of score books on and thereby specify the content of the interlocutor’s expression: de dicto and de re. The de dicto book distinguishes and inferentially correlates the commitments the interlocutor is disposed to acknowledge by overt performances; contents so specified are correspondingly what the interlocutor takes himself to be expressing. The de re book, by contrast, is an inferential articulation of what commitments the interlocutor actually undertakes or ought to undertakes in those performances, thereby specifies what contents he actually expresses. (Brandom, 1994: 505-6) In short, the model consists of a dual sense of perspective: the two sorts of book are about (possibly) different perspectives towards a same commitment, but both are construed from the interpreter’s point of view.

A further distinction on the notion of commitment would facilitate our later discussion. In a score book of an interpreter, attributing a commitment is always simultaneously ascribes what I call entitlement conditions (the proper inferential function) to that commitment. In the de re book, the entitlement conditions consist of the proper circumstances and consequences of the performing that the interpreter thinks
his interlocutor ought to possess and accomplish. However, even though entitlement conditions are needed to specify the contents of commitment undertaken, decision of whether entitlements can be attributed depends on whether, according to the interpreter, the interlocutor performs in the proper circumstances and does right things afterwards. The interlocutor may or may not recognize or fulfill those conditions in practices. Thus, commitments undertaken can be correspondingly further divided into those ascribed as entitled and those aren’t. A similar distinction can be made to those commitments in a de dicto book.

For Brandom, de dicto ascriptions are of the form ‘S believes that Φ(t)’, but de re belief-ascriptions are of the form ‘S believes of t’ that Φ(it)’. (Brandom, 1994: 502) Contents ascribed in de re book are thus said to be objective because it specifies the aboutness of an attributed asserting: "what individual, according to the ascriber, it is whose properties must be investigated in order to determine whether the ascribed belief [claim] is true." (Brandom, 1994: 584) The de re specifications are then thought of as expressing the attitude-transcendent or perspective-transcendent notion of objective correctness, the cash value of the conviction that "object and the world of facts that comprises them are what they are regardless of what anyone takes them to be." (Brandom, 1994: 594) On the other hand, the contents ascribed in de dicto book is said to be subjective because it specifies the attitudes various individuals interpreted have towards the objects specified in the de re book.3

Since different interpreters might have different collateral commitments, they might be dear to different de re specifications (even if they are assumed to talk about the same objects). Moreover, since there is no perspective-neutral content articulation and that there is no ‘bird’s-eye view’ to decide which “perspective is privileged in advance over any other” (Brandom, 1994: 601), Brandom has no intention to

3 Ascribers of S acknowledge commitment to the identity t = t’, which S himself might not. (Brandom, 1994: 507)
decide what claims are true, that is, correctly taken to be true. Nonetheless, content articulation always allows the possibility of objective/subjective distinction. That is because in each of interpretive perspectives there are two possibly distinct sorts of content specification, de re and de dicto books, so each perspective affords a possible objective/subjective distinction. “The explicit expression of the structural distinction of perspective between undertaking and attributing commitments”, Brandom writes, “is a general acknowledgment by each interlocutor of the possibility for any $S$ and $p$ that $S$ believes that $p$ but it is not true that $p$.” (Brandom, 1994: 604) Engaging in the discursive practice of giving and asking for reasons is a general acknowledgement of being a subject of other’s de dicto book, hence an acknowledgement of the possibility of error.

II. Brandom’s Proof

Brandom claims that the scorekeeping model not only makes sense of the perspectival objectivity, but also suffices to illuminate how his pragmatic semantics is free from NCE. But it appears not. In the perspectivist account, the possibility of perspectival difference between individuals grounds the possibility of the error of any belief of anyone. Since people often disagree with each other, one can indeed easily appreciate the possible contrast between individuals’ perspectives. But on what grounds are we to make sense of the possibility of communal error? A bird’s-eye view is of course not a viable ground. In the perspectivist account, the possibility of communal error has to be apprehended in the eyes of some individual, but in the case of communal consensus individuals appear to be lack of different perspectives to contrast with. I do not claim Brandom’s giant book affords no ground to clear away the appearance, but I do think it calls for a more detailed story than the score-keeping model. Brandom thinks otherwise. He thinks he has a knockdown proof.
NCE is a quantified conditional, and conditionals here are conceived by Brandom as expressing the pragmatic relation of incompatibility entailments. “The official definition of this sort of conditional is that $p \rightarrow q$ just in case everything incompatible with $q$ is incompatible with $p$.” (Brandom, 1994: 602) Incompatibility among two propositional contents is further defined by the pragmatic notions of commitment and entitlement: “propositional contents are incompatible just in case commitment to one precludes entitlement to the other.” (Brandom, 1994: 602) Conditionals so understood, NCE is in effect saying that anything incompatible with an arbitrarily given $p^\alpha$ is incompatible with $(S)$ (S claims that $p^\alpha$).

Not surprisingly, to reject NCE, Brandom proposes a claim that will defeat the incompatibility entailment of NCE. More specifically, he finds a $q^\alpha$ and a $p^\alpha$ such that $q^\alpha / p^\alpha$ (following Brandom, ‘$q/p$’ is used here and after to express $q$’s incompatibility with $p$) and not $q^\alpha / (S)(S$ claims that $p\alpha$). The proof goes as follows: (Brandom, 1994: 603-4)

Let $p^\alpha$ be:

$$(p) (~!xDx$ claims that $p),$$

which is that the unique $D$ does not have any belief; and let $q^\alpha$ be:

$!xDx$ claims that $p^\alpha,$

that is:

$!xDx$ claims that $(p) (~!xDx$ claims that $p),$ which claims that the unique $D$ believes that the unique $D$ does not have any belief. Given this, Brandom claims: (1) it is the case that $q^\alpha / p^\alpha$, "since $q^\alpha$ attributes a belief to $!xDx$ and $p^\alpha$ denies that $!xDx$ has any beliefs"; and (2) it is not the case that $q^\alpha / (S)$ (S claims that $p^\alpha$), “for

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4 Belief and claim are different sorts of commitment for Brandom (Brandom, 1994: 504), but the difference carries no implications in his proof.
\( q^\alpha \) is just an instance of that quantified claim and so is entailed by it: if (S) (S claims that \( p^\alpha \)), then \( !xDx \) claims that \( p^\alpha \).” (Brandom, 1994: 603-4)

The \( q^\alpha \) is evidently paradoxical and few, if any, will endorse it. But it doesn’t matter. As Brandom notes: “there is no requirement that a content that defeats a conditional claiming such an [incompatibility] entailment...be true – or one the one assessing the conditional endorses.” (Brandom, 1994: 711, n. 97) If two contents are incompatible with each other, “then anyone committed to the one content would be precluded from entitlement to the other.” (Brandom, 1994: 605).

III. Where Brandom’s Proof Fails

The validity of Brandom's proof is only prima facie. In Brandom’s pragmatic view, a robust defeat to the conditional, (S) [S claims that \( p \) (¬!xDx claims that \( p \)) \( \rightarrow \) (p) (¬!xDx claims that \( p \))], should consist of a demonstration to the effect that commitment to \( q^\alpha \) precludes the entitlement to the conditional’s consequent but not the entitlement to its antecedent. Curiously enough, Brandom’s proof omits the pragmatic notions needed in the incompatibility check. When we reconsider the incompatibility check in the pragmatic terms, it will be found either that the recipe suggested for the proof is unavailable or that the proof simply does not go through.

Before we go any further, there is a potential issue that has to be addressed. As Brandon sets to prove that \( (p)[I \ claim that \ p] \rightarrow p \) is not a consequence of his account, he remarks that he proof is not aiming to address a "pragmatic matter concerning attitudes", but rather at a "semantic matter concerning the contents to which they [the attitudes] are addressed" (Brandom, 1994: 605). Thereof, one might think that, contrary to what I think here, Brandom needs not construe his proof in pragmatic terms. But this is a misunderstanding. What Brandom reminds of us by the distinction between pragmatic and semantic matters
is a correct conception of the pragmatic side of his semantics. It is that when we consider the content of an expression we must not only considering the speaker’s own attitude toward the content, but also “some else’s attitudes toward the same content” (Brandom, 1994: 605). Social dimension is required in specifying the pragmatic structure needed for articulating semantic content. To repeat, the point is not that semantic property of expression can be conceived independently of pragmatic attitudes, but that the pragmatic attitudes required in explicating contents have to be socially conceived.

It is the keystone of Brandom’s semantics that it be construed in pragmatic terms, and compatibility and incompatibility are two key notions in the pragmatics. If the two notions can be make sense without pragmatic terms, it is unclear what left in grounding Brandom’s pragmatic semantics. (Cf. Brandom, 1994: 160) Semantics is, at most, less than fully articulated without pragmatics.

In the *de re* book of $S^p$ on $S^α$’s asserting, $S^α$’s commitment to $q^α$ [!$xDx$ claims that ($p$) ($\sim$!$xDx$ claims that $p$)] can be specified in either of the following two ways:

**DRR:** $S'$ believes of $S^α$ that he$^{(Sα)}$, who is !$xDx$, believes of himself$^{(Sα)}$ that he$^{(Sα)}$ has no beliefs.

**DRD:** $S'$ believes of $S^α$ that he$^{(Sα)}$, who is !$xDx$, believes that !$xDx$ has no beliefs.

**DRR** is a specification of $S'$’s metalinguistic *de re* claims, where reference is fully transparent to both $S'$ and $S^α$; **DRD** is of $S'$’s metalinguistic *de dicto* ones, where referential transparency is only to $S'$, that is, $S^α$ might not believe that !$xDx$ is himself.

It should be noted that the undertaken/acknowledged commitments distinction does not bear on the incompatibility check — talk of commitments undertaken suffices. A *de dicto* book of an interpreter contains records of one of his interlocutors’ normative attitudes, which are the very same basis on which the interlocutor’s *de re* books on his own interlocutors are constructed. So, a *de dicto* book is and must be a
record of what might appear in someone’s de re book. Moreover, incompatibility check on a conditional $p \rightarrow q$ is processing in universal terms: for any interpreter $S^\beta$ and any given propositional content $r$, if $S^\beta$ takes it to be improper to attribute any speaker $S^\alpha$ with both commitment to $r$ and entitlement to $q$ (and vice versa), then $S^\beta$ must take it to be improper to attribute $S^\alpha$ with both commitment to $r$ and entitlement to $p$ (and vice versa).

The commitment specified as DRR should appear in no one’s de re book, for its content is void. The defect of DRR so construed is easily disguised and ignored in Brandom’s trading up commitment talk with belief talk. It is indeed quite imaginable that DRR, where belief were to be conceived as mental states or dispositions, is a description of a state one, like a skeptic, might in when he has a reason or reaches to a conclusion. Hence, one might be tempted into thinking that the commitment DRR has some sort of inferential role and therefore is eligible for a de re book. But, this is a misconception of DRR. For Brandom, commitments in de re books are normative status ascribed, not mental states or dispositions described. To make the ascriptive characteristics vivid, what $S^\beta$ believes of in DRR is better be reformulated in a less misleading way as ‘$S^\alpha$ undertakes a commitment that he$_{(S^\alpha)}$ has no commitments’.

But what does one do when one says of $S^\alpha$ that he$_{(S^\alpha)}$ has no commitments? According to Brandom, to be rational is to be capable of being in the game of giving and asking for reasons, to be capable of undertaking and attributing commitments. So one thing that one does in so saying is to preclude $S^\alpha$ from being rational, since $S^\alpha$ is said to have no commitments. On the other hand, since making a claim is undertaking a commitment, another thing that one does in so saying is to make a commitment and therefore undertake the status of being rational. So when $S^\alpha$ says of himself that he no beliefs, he is doing two things simultaneously: Undertaking and precluding himself from the status of being rational. It is impossible to do so. Thus, the content of what $S^\alpha$ believes of or commits to in DRR is void. There is no such a commitment as DRR.
Those who think that it is intelligible for one to believe of himself as a being with no beliefs might not be convinced by my treatment of DRR. And they may as well think that DRR is not what really matters anyway, since, as the example of mark on the flagstone Brandom gives in his proof shows, DRD is more likely what Brandom has in mind for S’s commitment to qα. But, in what follows, I shall prove that qα construed in DRD does not suffice to be a defeater to (S) [S claims that (p) (∼!xDx claims that p)] → (p) (∼!xDx claims that p).

Commitment to qα construed in DRD, unlike DRR, is obviously ascribable, since the referent of ‘!xDx’ is not transparent to S. And, indeed, qα so construed is, as Brandom points out, incompatible with (p) (∼!xDx claims that p). However, it is of crucial importance to point out that qα is also incompatible with pα, i.e., (S) [S claims that (p) (∼!xDx claims that p)]. S’s commitment to pα should be understood as that S believes of any S, including himself, that S believes that !xDx has no beliefs. So understood, S’s commitment to pα implies that S believes of himself that he believes that !xDx has no beliefs. Since, for Brandom, iteration of belief, conceived as commitment, is redundant (see below), we shall have the consequence that S believes that !xDx has no beliefs. This consequence is incompatible with qα, since the former says of !xDx that he has no beliefs, the latter says of him that he has. This objection is in fact independent of any reading of qα, hence it works however qα is to be understood.

The redundancy of iteration of commitment is, again, easily obscured by Brandom’s substituting talk of commitment with talk of belief. When belief is conceived as attitude, it is arguable that when we say of someone as believing that he believes that pα, we are not forced to attribute him with the belief that pα. But, as have said, in one’s de re book, commitments are normative status, not attitudes. Notions of normative status like right and obligation allow the following inference: if one has a right to the right to P, then it is clear that he has the right to P; if one is obliged to the obligation of P, then one is obliged to P. The denying of one’s right to P itself is the concealing of his right to such a right. Relieving one’s obligation of P itself is relieving one’s obligation
to such an obligation. The notion of commitment allows the same kind of inference.

Another way of seeing the redundancy is this. In saying that a speaker undertakes a commitment to $p^a$, one presupposes that the speaker does something that bears the commitment to $p^a$. In the same vein, in attributing to a speaker a commitment to the commitment to $p^a$, one presupposes that the speaker undertakes the commitment to $p^a$.

The line of thought I pursue here clearly presupposes that the ascriber of the (S) [S claims that $p^a$ ($\neg \exists x Dx$ claims that $p$)] is an insider of S community. On this assumption, the ascriber’s attribution of $p^a$ would preclude his attribution of $q^a$. So perhaps, an outsider of the community might be in a position to do that. But thinking of such a position is an illusion. Suppose that S is the community of all rational beings. Then there is simply no ascriber outside of the community. Suppose that the ascriber is a rational being outside the community. In this case, the content of the expression (S) (S claims that $p$) are not the same, so the incompatibility check does not even get started. For the insider, (S) (S claims that $p$) means “we all believe that $p$”; for the outsider, it means “they all believe that $p$.” The incompatibility check has to be about the same content, and therefore the ascriber has to be an insider. So, either the outsider is a non-rational being or he is unable to process the incompatibility check. In both case, the incompatibility check fails. If there is any prospect for Brandom’s proof, the attributor has to be an insider. But in that case, my argument prevails.

Brandom claims that “not all the counterexamples to (ii) [NCE] has this form $[q^a]$, but the pattern indicated shows how to construct a whole family of them.” (Brandom, 1994: 604) One might wish to wait to meet the rest of the family members. But the waiting is a lost cause. By generalizing the observation of this section, I am going to prove that the family has no members.
IV. No Communal Error

My argument consists of two steps. The first is for two lemmas; the second is a reductio proving that there is no propositional content which is incompatible with \( p^a \) but not with \((S) (S \text{ claims that } p^a)\). In a first sketch, the two lemmas are these:

L1. *Any* interpreter deems it proper to attribute to an interlocutor commitment to \((S) (S \text{ claims that } p^a)\); therefore, he must deem it proper to attribute to the interlocutor commitment to \(p^a\).

L2. *Any* interpreter deems it proper to attribute to an interlocutor entitlement to \((S) (S \text{ claims that } p^a)\); therefore, he must deem it proper to attribute to the interlocutor entitlement to \(p^a\).

But \((S) (S \text{ claims that } p^a)\) calls for modification. If \((S) (S \text{ claims that } p^m)\) is to be understood as meaning that all members in the community say, with or without warrants, that \(p^a\), L1 and, especially, L2 might not hold. But \((S) (S \text{ claims that } p^m)\) construed in such a way is disingenuous to the notion of objectivity corresponding to the denial of NCE. When one says of the collapse of objectivity to communal attitudes, one respects notion of objectivity enough to appeal to warranted assertions, not merely wishful ones. The communal statue that deserves a trading up with the notion of objectivity must be entitled commitment. To this consideration, our two lemmas should be rewritten respectively as follows:

L1’. *Any* interpreter deems it proper to attribute to an interlocutor commitment to \((S) (S \text{ justifiably claims that } p^a)\) (or, equivalently, \((S) (S \text{ is entitled to the commitment to } p^a)\)); therefore, he must deem it proper to attribute to the interlocutor commitment to \(p^a\);

L2’. *Any* interpreter deems it proper to attribute to an interlocutor entitlement to \((S) (S \text{ justifiably claims that } p^a)\) (or, equivalently, \((S) (S \text{ is entitled to } p^a)\)); therefore, he must deem it proper to attribute to the interlocutor entitlement to \(p^a\).
Let's see whether \textbf{L1}' holds. According to $S^\beta$, $S^\alpha$ commits to $(S$ (\(S\) justifiably claims that \(p^\alpha\)). What appears in $S^\beta$'s score book when she deems proper to attribute to $S^\alpha$ the commitment? Clearly, one thing in the book is that $S^\alpha$ himself commits to that $S^\alpha$ justifiably claims that $p^\alpha$, since it is just an instance of $(S$ (\(S\) justifiably claims that \(p^\alpha\)). And claiming that $p^\alpha$ is undertaking a commitment to $p^\alpha$, so $S^\alpha$ is committing to an entitlement to the commitment to $p^\alpha$. Since it is an obvious truth that if one is entitled to a commitment then he undertakes that commitment, we have in $S^\beta$'s score book that $S^\alpha$ is committing to the commitment to $p^\alpha$. This, with the redundancy of iteration of commitment (in a de re book), gives us the result that $S^\alpha$ is committing to $p^\alpha$ in $S^\beta$'s score book.

Some might doubt that when one is entitled to a commitment then he undertakes that commitment. When one is entitled to an engagement, one is certainly not necessarily committing to the engagement. But this quandary would be quelled when one remembered the nature of our proof. It is to prove that when every one of us believes that $p$, $p$ might still be false. So it is presupposition of the proof that any of us is in fact undertaking the commitment that $p$. If there is any one who is not undertake that commitment, the game is not even started.

\textbf{L2}' is obvious. According to $S^\beta$, $S^\alpha$ is entitled to the commitment to $(S$ (\(S\) justifiably claims that \(p^\alpha\)). What is $S^\beta$ doing when she deems it proper to attribute to $S^\alpha$ such entitlement? $S^\beta$ endorses the following — $S^\alpha$ is justified in believing that $(S$ (\(S\) justifiably claims that \(p^\alpha\)). In doing so, $S^\beta$ acknowledges that everyone in the community, including $S^\alpha$, justifiably claims that $p^\alpha$. And this is just what we want: To ascribe $S^\alpha$ with the entitlement to $(S$ (\(S\) justifiably claims that \(p^\alpha\)) is to acknowledge that $S^\alpha$ is entitled to be claiming that $p^\alpha$.

With the two lemmas in place, it can be shown quite straightforwardly that there is no such a propositional content $r$ that it is incompatible with $p^\alpha$ but not with $(S$ (\(S\) justifiably claims that \(p^\alpha\)). I process the argument by a reductio. Suppose there was such a content $r$, then,
by definition, the following three claims hold (let ‘Cr’ stand for ‘a commitment to r’ and ‘Er’ for ‘an entitlement to r’):

N1. \((Cr \& Ep^\alpha)\) is precluded.

N2. \((Cp^\alpha \& Er)\) is precluded.

N3. \((Cr \& E(S(S justifiably claims that p^\alpha))\) is not precluded, or \\
\((C(S(S justifiably claims that p^\alpha)) \& Er)\) is not precluded.\(^5\)

The notion of preclusion is not fully illuminated in Brandom’s book, but it can be reasonably understood in pragmatic terms like these: \(N1\) means that for anyone it is not proper to ascribe anyone with \((Cr \& Ep^\alpha)\); and the first disjunct of \(N3\) means that for someone it is proper to ascribe someone with \((Cr \& E(S(S claims that p^\alpha)))\).

Given \(L1\) and \(L2\), we can infer from \(N3\) that

\(N4. (Cr \& Ep^\alpha)\) is not precluded, or \((Cp^\alpha & Er)\) is not precluded.

\(N4\) contradicts the combination of \(N1\) and \(N2\). So we are bound to conclude that there is no such a thing as \(r\). It is thus decided that \(NCE\) will be a consequence of Brandom’s scorekeeping model in its current form.

V. No First-Person Error

Worse still, with the material available from the last proof we can easily prove that what Brandom calls the No First-Person Error Condition (hereafter, \(NFPE\)), \((p) [(I claim that p) \rightarrow p]\) (Brandom, 1994: 605), will also be a consequence of his account. But again to put up to the weight of objectivity, \(NFPE\) should be more reformulated as \((p) [(I justifiably claim that p) \rightarrow p]\). Since the ‘I’ in \(NFPE\) is the interlocutor

\(^5\) The notations in \(N1-N3\) are borrowed from Sven Rosenkranz (2001). Rosenkranz reaches a similar conclusion via a different route from mine.
himself, the materials offered in the above proof should allow us to have the following two lemmas: \( L_3' \) and \( L_4' \), which are just like \( L_1' \) and \( L_2' \) respectively except in which \( '(S) (S \text{ justifiably claims that } p^{\alpha})' \) is substituted with 'I justifiably claims that \( p^{\alpha} \).

A similar *reductio* can then be processed against any \( r \) proposed to defeat \textbf{NFPE}. Suppose we have such an \( r \), then we have \( \textbf{N1}, \textbf{N2}, \) and \( \textbf{N3}' \). \((\text{Cr} \& \text{E(I justifiably claims that } p^{\alpha}))\) is not precluded, or \((\text{C(I justifiably claims that } p^{\alpha}) \& \text{Er})\) is not precluded.

From \( L_3', L_4' \) and \( N_3' \), \( N_4 \) is derivable to contradict the conjunction of \( \textbf{N1} \) and \( \textbf{N2} \).

**VI. Concluding Remark**

One of the most serious conceptual challenges facing any pragmatic semantics is to accommodate the objectivity conviction that our attitudes are answering to things that transcend our attitudes, in the sense that we might be wrong about how they are. This paper shows that Brandom’s pragmatic semantics fails for the task. I suspect that the failure is fundamentally due to Brandom’s individualistic perspectivist perspective on meaning. All the theoretical resources Brandom could eventually have for the content specification project is perspectives of individuals. Though the pragmatic semantics is claimed to be socially articulated, the social practice pictured is in fact seen from individualistic perspective. This can be seen from Brandom’s characterization of the objective/subjective distinction which is the pathway to his objectivity proof. The distinction is construed in terms that in each of interpretive perspectives there are two possibly distinct sorts of content specification, *de re* and *de dicto* books, so each perspective affords a possible objective/subjective distinction.

I suggest that to account for objectivity in particular and content in general in pragmatic terms, one has in his/her theoretical repertoire a
conceptual platform articulated in a genuine intersubjective perspective. What I have in mind for example is Davidson’s triangulation story. Even when we are not opt for a pragmatic semantics, I expect further that McDowell would be right at that unless one concedes that we are able to hear meanings in our neighbor’s words, one’s semantic articulation in general would be misguided and hopeless.
References


無社群與第一人稱錯誤

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摘要

布藍登的《說明白》(Making It Explicit) 主張一種實用主義的語意理論 (pragmatic semantics)，他認為他的理論所面臨最大挑戰，是呈現出他的理論不會違反以下這個客觀性原則：我們的態度所關於的對象是超越我們的態度的。布藍登書中總結的一章是第八章，在該章中，他直接面對那個挑戰，他試圖證明他的理論不會有以下的後果：(p)[(S) (S 宣稱 p) → p] (名為「無社群錯誤條件句」, No Communal Error Condition)。在本文中，我論證布藍登的論證是失敗的，同時我也將證明「無社群錯誤條件句」以及布藍登所謂的「無第一人稱錯誤條件句」 (No Communal Error Condition, (p) [(我宣稱 p) → p]) 在適度且微幅的修正下，將可從他的實用主義的語意理論中導出。

關鍵詞：布蘭登、客觀性、推論語意學、語用語意學