

How (Not) to Relate Cognitive Externalism and Rule-Following*

Kai-Yuan Cheng

Department of Philosophy, National Chung-Cheng University

Abstract

Miller (2004) has recently argued for the following two claims: (1) McDowell (1992a), in the context of discussing Putnam's (1975) Twin-Earth argument, derives a particular form of cognitive externalism from his favored solution to Kripke's Wittgenstein's "skeptical paradox" about rule-following, and (2) McDowell's derivation fails. In this paper, I argue for the following two points. First, though Miller's. Second, McDowell does argue for some form of cognitive externalism when discussing Putnam, but his argument consists in merely pointing

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out a possibility of drawing the conclusion of the Twin-Earth argument that Putnam fails to see, and in diagnosing why Putnam fails to see it. My analysis of why Miller makes the attributive error is that he has not sufficiently appreciated the quietist methodology which McDowell widely and persistently adopts in dealing with philosophical problems. This paper concludes with a suggestion of how we should not relate rule-following and cognitive externalism.

Keywords: Rule-Following, Externalism, McDowell, Quietism

I.

Miller (2004) has recently argued that McDowell (1992a) derives a particular form of cognitive externalism from his favored solution to Kripke's Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox, but that this derivation fails. I argue that McDowell does not intend to propose this derivation. McDowell at most shows that there is the possibility of a form of cognitive externalism that Putnam (1975) fails to see, and shows why he fails to see it. I further argue that Miller has not adequately appreciated the quietist methodology which McDowell has extensively and persistently employs in resolving philosophical problems. As a result, Miller attributes an erroneous move to McDowell that he does not make. Through uncovering Miller's important attributive mistake and why he makes this error, this paper aims to better illuminate the relation between rule-following and cognitive externalism.

II.

Putnam has famously employed the Twin-Earth argument to show that "meaning ain't in the head." (1975: p. 227). However, McDowell (1992a) suggests that an alternative consequence of the Twin-Earth argument can be drawn. Miller helpfully illustrates the difference between the lines of reasoning of Putnam and of McDowell. Miller asks us to consider the following argument:

- (A) The sense of "...is water" determines its extension.
- (B) Grasping the sense of "...is water" is just a matter of being in a certain psychological state.

(C) Psychological states are “psychological states in the narrow sense” (“states whose attribution to a subject entails nothing about her environment”).

(D) As far as psychological states in the narrow sense are concerned, Oscar and Toscar are identical.

(E) Given (A), (B), (C), (D), the extensions of “...is water”, as used by Oscar and Toscar, are identical.

But from the twin earth rehearsed above:

(F) The extensions of “...is water”, as used by Oscar and Toscar, differ.

(G) Contradiction, from (E) and (F).

Thus,

(H) We must give up either (A), (B), (C), or (D).¹

Miller says that Putnam accepts (C) while rejects (B). Putnam’s idea is this. Grasping the meaning of a term is a mental act. Given that such a mental act does not determine the extension of the term, as the Twin-Earth argument establishes, it must be the case that grasping meaning is not just a matter of being in a certain psychological state. Meaning must lie “outside of a person’s head”, so to speak. This is a form of semantic externalism. Implicit in Putnam’s meaning externalism is the assumption that a psychological state is “in the head”, or “narrow”, in the sense that the attribution of it to a speaker entails nothing about the speaker’s environment.

On the other hand, Miller says that McDowell (1992a) sees an alternative way to construe the matter. McDowell, in contrast, rejects (C), thus opening up the possibility of embracing both (A) and (B). His idea

¹ Miller (2004), pp. 128-29.

is simple. Grasping meaning is a mental act, and hence meanings are in the mind. The Twin-Earth argument has shown that meanings are not in the head. Therefore, we ought to conclude that the mind is not entirely in the head. McDowell's major claim is that Putnam ignores a possibility that is agreeable to Putnam's own thesis of semantic externalism, that psychological states are wide, in the sense that attributions of psychological states involves the attributor's commitments to the environment of the attributee. McDowell's way of construing the mind is a form of cognitive externalism, as opposed to Putnam's *semantic externalism*.

We should note that it is one thing for McDowell to show that cognitive externalism is a possibility, and it is quite another thing to demonstrate its plausibility. Does McDowell offer any argument in support of cognitive externalism? Miller (2004) maintains that the answer is positive. In Miller's interpretation, McDowell argues that his Wittgensteinian dissolution of Kripke's Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox (1982) gives us reason to accept cognitive externalism. According to Miller, McDowell's argument for cognitive externalism runs as follows:

(1) In conceiving psychological states as narrow, Putnam has presupposed a certain theoretical conception of the mind. Miller (2004: 134) cites McDowell as follows:

What Putnam never seems to consider is the possibility of a position that holds that command of a meaning is wholly a matter of how it is with someone's mind, and combines that with the determination of extension by meaning so as to force a radically non-solipsistic conception of the mind to come to explicit expression. Instead, he assumes that anyone who wants to conceive knowledge of a meaning as wholly a matter of how it is with someone's mind must be already-committed to a theoretical conception of the mind...which, in conjunction with Putnam's reflections about meaning, guarantees that the wish cannot be fulfilled. (McDowell, 1992a: 40-1)

What does the “theoretical conception of the mind” amount to? Miller (2004: 134) finds in McDowell the following view:

Putnam without demur, lets “mentalism” be commandeered for the view that the topic of mental discourse can appropriately be specified as “the mind/brain”. Talk of the mind/brain embodies the assumption that the mind is appropriately conceived as an organ, of course, with the idea—which is in itself perfectly sensible—that if the mind is an organ, the brain is the only organ it can sensibly be supposed to be. The assumption that the mind is an organ is one that Putnam does not challenge...In fact much of his own thinking seems to presuppose just such a conception of the mind. (McDowell, 1992a: 42-3)

In McDowell’s construal, the theoretical conception of the mind Putnam implicitly holds is the view that the mind is the “organ of psychological activity.”

(2) Miller claims that to view the mind as an organ of psychological activity is to embrace the Master Thesis. The Master Thesis is expressed by McDowell, in a paper discussing the issue of rule-following and cited by Miller (2004: 131), as follows:

{The mind} is populated exclusively with items that, considered in themselves, do not sort things outside the mind, including specifically bits of behavior, into those that are correct or incorrect in the light of those items. (McDowell, 1992b, in 1998: 264).

The Master Thesis states that a mental item is like a sign-post, which by itself has no content inherent in it, and consequently, it cannot determine correct or incorrect applications of it. Miller maintains that in McDowell’s understanding, when Putnam regards the mind as an organ of thought, Putnam is assimilating it to a sign-post, which just

stands there without any content inherent in it. Miller (2004: 135) cites the following paragraph of McDowell to endorse this reading:

Putnam's governing assumption here is that a mental state or occurrence that is representational...must in itself consist in the presence in the mind of an item with an intrinsic nature characterizable independently of considering what it represents. (*Such a state of affairs would be what an internal arrangement in an organ of thought would have to amount to*) (McDowell, 1992a: 43)

(3) The Master Thesis is an extremely counter-intuitive and hence unacceptable thesis, as has been extensively shown in McDowell's dissolution of the rule-following paradox. Miller cites McDowell's explicit rejection of the Master Thesis as follows:

Once we realize that, the Master-Thesis should stand revealed as quite counterintuitive, not something on which a supposed need for constructive philosophy could be convincingly based. (McDowell, 1992b: 46).

(4) Therefore, if to treat a mental state as narrow is to view the mind as "an organ", which is in turn to accept the Master Thesis, given that the Master Thesis is highly implausible, there is no good reason to conceive of a mental state as narrow. Thus, a form of cognitive externalism is supported.

I will contend with the above reasoning which Miller attributes to McDowell, by showing that it is an inappropriate attribution. In particular, I find step 2 in the above argument especially problematic. This will be more extensively discussed in the next section.

Having depicted McDowell's line of reasoning as above, Miller goes on to argue that McDowell's argument fails. To pave the way for illustrating Miller's argument, we need to first clarify the distinction between sense and extension on the one hand, and the distinction between sense and environment on the other hand. We may use addition as an example for this purpose. The sense of the "+" sign is the *plus*

function, whose extension is an infinite set of triples: $\langle 1, 1, 2 \rangle$, $\langle 1, 2, 3 \rangle$, $\langle 2, 2, 4 \rangle$, and so on. Now suppose that a person attempts to apply the “+” sign to calculate the *sum* of two piles of objects in the real world. This task requires two steps on the person’s side: The first step is that the person has to grasp the “pattern” of usage regarding the “+” sign and relevant numerals determined by the extensions of the *plus* function associated with “+”. The second step is that the person has to get the quantities of the two piles of objects right, in order to apply this grasped pattern of usage to them. In other words, applying a sign like “+” to the world involves an indirect link from the sense of “+” to its extensions, and then to objects in the world. The relation between sense and extension and the relation between sense and the world are thus distinct.

Now, Miller’s argument, to simplify it a bit, is as follows. The Master Thesis, as explained earlier, concerns the relation between the sense of a sign-post (or a term) and correct applications of it. More specifically, the Master Thesis treats a sign-post as void of any sense, and hence a sign-post by itself cannot determine the correct use of it. Assimilating a mental state such as a thought to a sign-post – a move that is attributed to Putnam by McDowell in Miller’s construal – a thought is regarded as having no representational content inherent in it. Therefore, the result of rejecting the Master Thesis as applied to thought is that a thought has its representational content essentially, which renders the thought intrinsically capable of determining correct tokenings of it. For example, it is essential to my thinking the thought that someone is drinking water in the next room that it has the representational content *that someone is drinking water in the next room*. The outcome of rejecting the Master Thesis is the establishment of a direct link between the sense (or content) of a thought and its extension.

Rejecting the Master Thesis is, however, as Miller points out, not the same thing as holding the thesis of cognitive externalism. Cognitive

externalism involves rejecting premise (C) that psychological states are narrow, which amounts to saying that it is essential to my thinking the thought that someone is drinking water in the next room *that there is (has been) some water in my environment*. Therefore, the result of rejecting premise (C) is the building up of a link between the content of a thought and the environment. Miller thus shows that rejecting the Master Thesis is logically independent of rejecting premise (C), for the former establishes an internal relation between sense and extension, while the latter concerns the relation between sense and the environment. The upshot is that rejecting the Master Thesis does not lead to the acceptance of cognitive externalism. Miller thus concludes that McDowell's derivation of cognitive externalism from the dissolution of Kripke's Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox is not a legitimate move.

III.

I agree that Miller's attack on the argument he attributes to McDowell is effective. However, I do not think that McDowell has committed himself to the line of argument Miller attributes to him. A close reading of McDowell's (1992a) response to Putnam shows that McDowell has never mentioned the Master Thesis, not to mention how the rejection of the Master Thesis based on his dissolution of the rule-following paradox (1984; 1992b) might support some form of cognitive externalism.

McDowell's support for cognitive externalism in the context of responding to Putnam, which is the focus of Miller's discussion, is entirely derived from a sort of passive work: by simply pointing out a possibility inherent in Putnam's own Twin-Earth argument that Putnam unfortunately fails to see. McDowell has made his intent clearly in the opening sections of his paper:

I want to ...urge a reading of the claim that the mind is not in the head that ought, I believe, to be congenial to Putnam, although as far as I can tell, it goes missing from the space of possibilities as he consider things, which is organized by the idea that the two assumptions cannot be made out to be compatible.²

McDowell has made it clear that his primary task consists in pointing out an alternative way of construing the Twin-Earth argument that Putnam himself had failed to consider. McDowell has actually carried out this task in the first two sections of his paper. He then devotes the rest of his paper, especially sections 5 to 8 where the idea of the mind as an “organ” is invoked, to diagnose what may have prevented Putnam from seeing the possibility. My contention with Miller’s attribution in question is that the attribution is incorrect, because it fails to show a proper appreciation of McDowell’s overt intent and implicit methodology.

To illuminate my point, we may return to Miller’s attribution of the argument to McDowell, described in the last part of section II, to see where Miller’s attribution goes astray. Step 1) states that McDowell ascribes the conception of the mind as an “organ” to Putnam when Putnam conceives a mental state as “narrow”. Miller’s attribution of step 1) to McDowell is clearly unproblematic: throughout sections 5 to 8, McDowell openly makes and discusses the claim stated in step 1). Step 2) continues to state that, if the mind is construed as an “organ”, its status is like a “sign-post”, and as a sign-post, it is incapable of sustaining a link between sense (linguistic meaning, or mental content) and extension (what counts as correct or incorrect application of a term or tokening of a thought). Steps 1) and 2) together captures the core of the Master Thesis. Thus, step 2) is crucially responsible for the argu-

² See McDowell (1992a), section 2: pp. 36.

ment which Miller attributes to McDowell and which falls prey to Miller's effective criticism. We have to ask: What may justify Miller in attributing step 2) to McDowell?

Miller has not clearly indicated how he sees McDowell (1992a) as associating the view of the mind as an "organ" with the Master Thesis. The only passage in McDowell that comes closest to back up Miller's attribution is as follows:

In Putnam's argument, mental representations are representations in the sense in which, say, drawings or sentences are representations. A representation is an item whose intrinsic nature is characterizable independently of its representational properties: a symbol. The nerve of Putnam's argument is that symbols are not intrinsically endowed with their representational properties, and that claim seems beyond question. (McDowell, 1992a: 43; underline emphasis mine)

In this paragraph, McDowell unambiguously construes Putnam as assimilating a mental state to a symbol, and points out that the consequence of this assimilation is that a mental state has its representational properties extraneous to it.

However, my contention is that, although McDowell talks of the mind as an "organ" and of a state of an "organ" as a "symbol", McDowell's talk is not meant to touch on the link between sense and extension, but on the link between sense and environment. McDowell is quite explicit on this. For example, in a paragraph that Miller also quotes (2004: 134-5), McDowell points out that Putnam fails to see the possibility of cognitive externalism because he holds a certain mistaken assumption:

...The assumption that the mind is an organ is one that Putnam does not challenge...An assumption to the same effect seems to underlie Putnam's argument, in *Reason, Truth and History*, that one cannot suppose that mental states or occurrences are intrinsically referential – intrinsically directed at the world – without falling into a magical conception of ref-

erence. Putnam's governing assumption here is that a mental state or occurrence that is representational...must in itself consist in the presence in the mind of an item with an intrinsic nature characterizable independently of considering what it represents. (Such a state of affairs would be what an internal arrangement in an organ of thought would have to amount to.) It clearly follows, from such a conception of that which is strictly speaking present in the mind, that such items cannot be intrinsically endowed with referential properties...The argument is controlled by the assumption that occurrences in the mind are, in themselves, "narrow". (1992a: 43; underlien emphasis mine)

In McDowell's view, what is responsible for Putnam's holding the unfavorable view that mental states are narrow is his accepting the false presupposition that mental states are not "intrinsically referential— intrinsically directed at the world". In some other paragraphs, McDowell is consistently concerned with the link between thought and reality, not with the link between sense and extension:

What the mental occurrence is in itself already involves that referential directedness at the world...So the possibility that goes missing in Putnam's argument could be described as the possibility of mental representing without representations." (1992a: 44; underlien emphasis mine)

Such a question (How does language hook on to the world? How does thinking hook on to the world?) looks like a pressing one only if we saddle ourselves with a conception of what thinking is, considered in itself, that deprives thinking of its characteristic bearing on the world—its being about this or that object in the world, and its being to the effect that this or that state of affairs obtains in the world. (1992a: 44; underlien emphasis mine)

The need to construct a theoretical “hook” to link thinking to the world does not arise, because if it is thinking that we have in view at all – say being struck by the thought that one hears the sound of water dripping – then what we have in view is *already* hooked on to the world; it is already in view as possessing referential directedness at reality. (1992a: 45; underlined emphasis mine)

In these paragraphs, among many others in sections 5 through 8 where McDowell discusses the view of the mind as an “organ”, McDowell suggests that the correct view to conceive the relation between a mental state and the world is to see that there is an essential link between them, and cognitive externalism is both an expression and consequence of this correct view.

In contexts other than the one where McDowell (1992a) tries to open up the possibility of cognitive externalism for Putnam (and us), McDowell (1992b) also appears fully aware of the distinction between the two kinds of relations – one between sense and extension, and the other between sense and environment. For example, when dealing with the issue of rule-following, where the mathematical case of extending a numerical series such as grasping the sense of “add 2” is discussed, McDowell writes:

There is a quite general link between the idea of understanding or grasp of a meaning, on the one hand, and the idea of behavior classifiable as correct or incorrect in the light of meaning grasped, ...on the other. (1992b: 264)

In the numerical case, McDowell is concerned with the possibility of making sense of the link between sense (or grasp of meaning) and extension (or correct behavior of linguistic application). This is to be contrasted with the ordinary use of an expression whose meaning suits it for describing the empirical world, which involves suitable connection between sense and environment:

Here, if one's utterance is to be correct, it needs to be faithful not only to the meaning of the expression but also to the layout of the empirical world. (1992b: 264)

McDowell notices that correct depiction of the world requires a double success: correctly putting one's grasp of meaning into certain linguistic applications and correctly describing the world with those linguistic applications. Hence, the case of ordinary words involves an indirect link between sense and the world. In contrast, when not applied to any actual case in the real world, the case of numerical terms involves a direct link between sense and extension. Since McDowell has noted the distinction between the typically "pure" use of numerical terms that involves no actual worldly situations and ordinary cases that involve applications to the real world, he would not regard the rejection of the Master Thesis as establishing the thesis of cognitive externalism, given that these two things are concerned with two different relations.

We may wonder: Why does Miller overlook the fact that McDowell is noticeably clear about the distinction between the two kinds of relation— one between the sense of a mental state and the world and the other between the sense of a mental state and its extension— and the fact that McDowell has the former relation in mind when he makes the case for cognitive externalism? May it be simply that Miller confuses two different ideas: namely, "the mind as an organ", and "the mind as a sign-post or symbol"? My opinion is that the cause of Miller's attributive error runs deeper than that. My analysis is that Miller's error is rooted in not having sufficiently appreciated the reason of why McDowell invokes the idea of construing the mind as an "organ"—either material (the brain) or immaterial (a Cartesian ego). McDowell's purpose is not to identify the idea in question as the problematic Master Thesis. Rather, his aim is to show that this idea underlies Putnam's construal of a mental state as "narrow", and more importantly, that this idea blocks Putnam from seeing the possibility of cognitive externalism as congenial to the Twin-Earth argument. In other

words, McDowell does adopt step 1) of the argument Miller attributes to him, which does not aim to lead to step 2), but to reveal that Putnam is trapped in an unreflective Cartesian view of the mind in which a mental state is self-standing and takes place in an autonomous realm not necessarily related to the world.

To emphasize, McDowell's invoking of the idea of the mind as an "organ" is non-constructive in nature, in the sense that he does not intend to offer the idea in question for the construction of some positive argument or account for a certain thesis about the mind. Rather, his purpose of doing so is to reveal why the correct view about the mind is blocked from our sights. In the context of dissolving a skeptical paradox about rule-following, McDowell has explicitly endorsed Wittgenstein's quietist view that "philosophy embodies no doctrine, no substantive claims." (1992b, in 1998: 277). The following statement of McDowell expresses this quietist meta-philosophy nicely:

...what we might ask for more of is not a constructive account of how human interactions make meaning and understanding possible, but rather a diagnostic deconstruction of the peculiar way of thinking that makes such a thing necessary. (1992b, in 1998: 278)

Although McDowell may not have explicitly stated the quietist methodology in his treatments of Putnam's Twin-Earth argument concerning what moral could be drawn from it, it shall be of little controversy that McDowell has adopted this methodology throughout his treatments.

It is thus fair to say that Miller wrongly accuses McDowell of committing to the fallacious move from a thesis about rule-following to a thesis about cognitive externalism. McDowell might need some independent argument to back up the acceptance of cognitive externalism, but he obviously does not intend to offer one when he considers the possible consequences of Putnam's Twin-Earth argument. McDowell's not having offered such an argument does not justify Miller in attribut-

ing one to McDowell, especially the one based on McDowell's dissolution of the rule-following paradox.

IV.

Does McDowell offer such an independent argument in support of cognitive externalism, instead of merely pointing out that the possibility of construing the consequence of Putnam's Twin-Earth argument as cognitive externalism exists? The answer is that McDowell does "argue for" some form of cognitive externalism in other contexts, but the way in which McDowell offers the "arguments" is consistently non-constructive in spirit. Showing how McDowell connects thought with reality in other contexts will not only lend us extra-support for rejecting Miller's interpretation and attack of McDowell, but it will also enable us to better appreciate the McDowell-style cognitive externalism.

There is at least one major source, as far as I can see, in which McDowell attempts to establish a direct link between the mental realm and the world of ordinary objects.³ In "Singular Thoughts and the Extent of Inner Space" (1986), McDowell attempts to develop a conception of thought in which ordinary objects can figure in the propositional content of a subject's propositional attitudes. McDowell's idea is to

³ Another source may be *Mind and World* (1994), where McDowell is also concerned with establishing the intrinsic link between thought and reality. But *Mind and World* seems to deal with the more fundamental issue of the possibility of empirical content, rather than with the distinct issue of cognitive externalism, which has to do with whether thought content is externally determined. I am indebted here to an anonymous referee for stressing this point to me. To avoid possible controversy and mistake, the discussion of *Mind and World* in the original version was removed from the paper.

reconcile a Fregean theory of senses with a Russellian analysis of singular propositions, in order to come out with the result that there could be singular propositions or senses that are object-dependent. McDowell's main proposal is to open up a possibility that many have missed. To be succinct, McDowell takes two steps to work out this idea.

First, he adopts Russell's conception of propositions in which a singular proposition has both conceptual and extra-conceptual elements – with conceptualized contents contributed by predicates and with the object denoted by a logically proper name. However, McDowell modifies it by discarding Russell's sense-data epistemology. Russell holds that for a person to think a singular thought, the person has to know what the thing is that she is thinking about. Consequently, to entertain a singular thought, one has to be acquainted with the object, which requires, in Russell's view, the notion of sense data, of items that are immediately present to the mind. McDowell claims that this part of Russell's theory, i.e., the sense-data epistemology, can be given up, and be replaced by Evans' account of perceptual demonstrative modes of presentation, where a person's thought contents are partly individuated by ordinary perceptible objects in the person's environment.

Second, McDowell embeds this Russellian account of singular propositions in a Fregean theory of senses. Frege's theory of senses maintains that propositions are constituted by senses that are fully conceptualized. This theory used to be regarded as unfit for a Russellian analysis of singular propositions. However, how could Fregean senses be entertained in thoughts whose contents depend on ordinary perceptible objects? It would seem natural, the line of thought continues, to suppose that Fregean senses can get contact with the world only indirectly through descriptive conceptual contents, which are thinkable in thoughts. It would thus seem that Russell's theory of descriptive propositions, rather than his theory of singular propositions, is the appropriate model to characterize Fregean senses. McDowell, however, maintains that this needs not be so. McDowell's innovation is to point out that there is nothing contradictory in combining the Russellian and the Fregean accounts. He expresses the idea as follows:

Russell's insight can perfectly well be formulated within this framework, by claiming that there are Fregean thought constituents (singular senses) that are object-dependent, generating an object-dependence in the thoughts in which they figure. (1986: 233)

If this idea could be made to work, there is a case in which the mind would not be entirely in the head, for a singular thought has an ordinary object as a constituent in the thought. The attribution of a singular thought to a person would hence entail something about the subject's environment.

The upshot is then that the way in which McDowell argues for cognitive externalism is not to construct a link between thought and reality, but to show that such a link is intrinsically there, once a possible way of reconciling two seemingly opposing views gets noticed.

My purpose here is not to defend the plausibility of McDowell's reconciliation of the two seemingly opposing frameworks. My emphasis is on how McDowell resolves this problem in a persistently non-constructive way, and on how this quietist methodology could get easily missed, even by someone such as Miller who is well aware of McDowell's meta-philosophy.⁴ This methodology underlies McDowell's opening up the possibility of cognitive externalism in the context of discussing Putnam, a strategy of which Miller is well aware. But Miller obvious does not pay special attention to the fact that this methodology also underlies McDowell's invoking of the idea of the mind as on "organ". The aim of invoking this idea is merely to diagnose why the possibility of cognitive externalism had evaded Putnam's notice, rather than to relate the idea to the issue of rule-following. This insufficient understanding of McDowell's comprehensively diagnostic

⁴ See Miller (1998), Chapter 6, where he gives a clear explication of McDowell's Wittgensteinian view on Kripke's rule-following paradox.

strategy is mainly responsible for Miller's inappropriately attributing to McDowell a fallacious move from rule-following to cognitive externalism.

The significance of McDowell's quietist approach should not be underestimated. Putnam (1995) later acknowledges that McDowell reminds him of the possibility of construing the consequence of the Twin-Earth argument differently, a possibility he used to ignore. Putnam expresses the change of his ideas as follows:

...such accomplishments as *knowing the meaning of words* and *using words meaningfully* are paradigmatic "mental abilities"; yet, I was not sure, when I wrote "The Meaning of Meaning", whether the moral of that essay should be that we shouldn't think of the meanings of words as lying in the mind at all, or whether (like John Dewey and William James) we should stop thinking of the mind as something "in the head" and think of it rather as a system of environment-involving capacities and interactions. In the end, I equivocated between these views. I said, on the one hand, that "meanings just ain't in the head", and, on the other hand, that the notion of mind is ambiguous, and that, in one sense of "mental state" (I called mental states, in this supposed sense, "narrow mental states"), our mental states are entirely in our heads, and in another sense, (I called mental states, in this supposed sense, "broad mental states"), a sense which includes such states as knowing the meaning of a word, our mental states are individuated by our relations to our environment and to other speakers and not simply by what goes on in our brains. Subsequently, under the influence of Tyler Burge and more recently of John McDowell as well, I have come to think that this conceded too much to the idea that the mind *can* be thought of as a private theater (situated inside the head). (1995: xviii; underlined emphasis mine)

Putnam originally thought that the only way to draw the moral of the Twin-Earth argument is meaning externalism, which then leaves the notion of the mental ambiguous—the mind can be construed as either

narrow or broad. Putnam then realized, under the influence of McDowell and Burge, that failing to suitably distinguish the two kinds of notions about the mental is unsatisfactory, for it gives room for a Cartesian picture of the mind. What McDowell helps Putnam to see is that there is an alternative way to draw the moral of the Twin-Earth argument, which avoids the Cartesian conception of the mind.

Putnam's recognition of McDowell's insight helps us to realize that a piece of significant philosophical work does not necessarily consist in offering some argument for a positive theory. Directing our attention to the possibility of a certain view could be important and sufficient when it comes to solving a philosophical problem.

V.

Miller begins his paper by asking a stimulating question regarding the relation between rule-following and cognitive externalism:

Does the correct response to the "skeptical paradox" about rule-following adumbrated by Kripke's Wittgenstein entail, or make more palatable, any interesting form of cognitive externalism? (2004: 127)

Miller claims that McDowell has answered this question affirmatively: the dissolution of the rule-following paradox leads to a form of cognitive externalism. Miller then shows that "there is no direct route from the dissolution of the rule-following paradox to McDowell's version of cognitive externalism." (Miller, 2004: 127) Miller ends his paper with a challenge "for those philosophers who think that there is a route from the rule-following considerations to McDowell-style cognitive externalism." (Miller, 2004: 139)

If what I have argued in this paper is right, there is no McDowell-style cognitive externalism as Miller describes and attacks. McDowell does not attempt to derive any form of cognitive externalism from the rule-following considerations. He recognizes that the issues of cognitive externalism and of rule-following are concerned with two different relations, and that no substantive work is required for these two issues to be connected. McDowell's endorsement of cognitive externalism is the result of merely diagnostic work; by pointing out some possibility that is overlooked, and by uncovering what may block the possibility from being seen, some form of cognitive externalism emerges itself. This approach underlies McDowell's treatments of Putnam's Twin-Earth argument, and of Russellian singular thoughts.

Therefore, a better way to respond to Miller's challenge in question may be to espouse an advice that McDowell would offer: Do not try to meet the challenge, because there is no need for doing it. The issues of rule-following and of cognitive externalism are distinct, and it had better be kept that way.

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如何（不要）從規則依循導出認知外在論

鄭凱元

國立中正大學哲學系

摘要

米勒 (Miller, 2004) 最近提出論證，支持以下兩點宣稱：（一）麥道爾 (McDowell, 1992a) 在論述如何恰當解讀帕特南 (Putnam, 1975) 的孿生地球論證 (Twin-Earth argument) 時，藉由他對克里奇的維根斯坦關於規則依循的懷疑論之解決方案，推導出某種形式之認知外在論 (cognitive externalism)；（二）然而，此一推導並不成功。在本文中，我的主要論點有二。首先，雖然米勒的第二宣稱是對的，但是麥道爾並沒有從對規則依循的懷疑弔詭之解決方案裡，推導出支持認知外在論的立場。其次，麥道爾確實在討論帕特南的脈絡裡，支持某種形式的認知外在論，但其論證方式僅止於指出，帕特南忽略了另一種可能導衍孿生地球論證的結論之方式，以及試圖說明為何帕特南沒能看到此可能性。

本文的主要目的除了在指出，由於米勒未能充分地體認到麥道爾在處理哲學問題時，所廣泛而持續地採取維根斯坦式靜默論 (quietism) 之方法論，以至於不恰當地歸給麥道爾一個他並無採取

之推論外，更希望藉由揭露米勒所犯的重要錯誤，釐清關於規則依循與認知外在論間之關係應如何界定之問題。

關鍵詞：規則依循、外在論、麥道爾、靜默論

