論柏拉圖對教育的= 841;個看法

自我超越與生死= 問題間的弔詭性：

胡塞爾與海德格= 對生死問題論述之比= 6611;<= /p>

汪文聖

國立政治大學哲學= 系

摘要

胡塞爾與海德格= 提出了不同的自我超= 6234;概念：胡塞爾以世஺= 8;的構成奠基在具自我&= #36229;越意涵之超越主體= 978;，海德格以存有的開= ;顯是此有自我超越之&#= 27512;趨。超驗主體的生û= 10;死表示著成就關乎世= 界知識與論述 (包括生死&#= 35542;述) 能力的擁&#= 26377;或喪失。此有的生Ō= 87;死形成了在世存有的= 整體性議題，但這裡= 5033;區分非本真 (有限) 的與本真 (無限) 的此有整&#= 39636;性。作為人死亡經Ƌ= 11;的「往死亡存有」可= 將此有從事實的 (被拋擲的) 有限整體&#= 24615;向存在的 (被投射的) 無限整體&#= 24615;去翻轉。本真的此ć= 77;整體性不為事實的生= 與死所封閉，卻向本= 0495;的「生命」去敞開ᦁ= 2;成為存有的開顯。對&= #19990;界知識的構成與論$= 848;也在事實的與封閉的= ;此有範圍內，故對生&#= 27515;問題的論述不是讓Ē= 92;有敞開的死亡經驗本= 身。成就一切論述之= 2993;塞爾式超驗主體必༴= 0;先「死亡」，才得以&= #35731;海德格式之此有向= 412;真的「生命」敞開。= ;論述 - 尤其是「&#= 35657;明」 – 常讓我們&#= 36960;離了本真的存在；Ê= 94;我們如何在「指明」= 關於生死問題種種的= 0070;而，時時警覺著、ߓ= 5;至反映著那最屬我們&= #33258;己的真實存在？

關鍵詞：&#= 29694;象學、時間性、自û= 05;超越、生死問題、胡= 塞爾、海德格、唐君毅= ;*

Paradox between the Self-Transcendence and= the Life-Death-Problem

The issu= e of the life-death-problem in Husserl and Heidegger

Wen-Shang Wang

Abrstract

Husserl= and Heidegger propose different conceptions of Self-Transcendence: Husserl sees= the constitution of the world founded on the transcendental subject which holds= the significance of Self-Transcendence; Heidegger thinks the disclosedness of B= eing (Sein) as the Whither (Wohin) of the Self-Transcendence of Being-There (Dasein). Life or Death of the transcendental subject means the possession or loss of the ability of knowing and discoursing upon= the world (including the discoursing upon Life and Death). Life and Death of Being-There makes an issue of the whole structure of the Being-in-the-world= . But here an authentic (unlimited) and an inauthentic (limited) whole of Being-T= here need be differentiated. As experience of death, Being-towards- death can tu= rn over the factical, thrown and limited whole of Being-There into the existential, projected and unlimited whole of Being-There. The authentic wh= ole of Being-There is not closed by the factical life and death, but open for an authentic “life” as the disclosedness of Being. Because the constitution and discourse upon the world knowledge belongs to the factical= and closed sphere of Being-There, so the discourse upon life and death is not t= he experience of death itself which let Being-There disclosed. The Husserlian transcendental subject, who benefits all discourses, must at first “die”, so that the Heideggerian Being-There can be open for the authentic “life”. The discourse – above all the “proof” – often lets us be far from the authentic existen= ce; but how can we be aware of and reflect the our ownmost authentic existence = only by “showing” the life-death-problem?

Keywords: phenomenology, temporality, self-transcendence, life-death-problem, Husserl, Heidegger, Tang Chün-Yi