MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/related; boundary="----=_NextPart_01C54DEB.AE309540" 此文件是「單一檔案網頁」,亦稱為「網頁封存檔案」。若看到此訊息,表示您的瀏覽器或編輯器不支援「網頁封存檔案」。請下載支援「網頁封存」的瀏覽器,例如 Microsoft Internet Explorer。 ------=_NextPart_01C54DEB.AE309540 Content-Location: file:///C:/B13369D1/9-1.htm Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" 論柏拉圖對教育的= 841;個看法

 

 

Experience and Rational External Constrain= t

=  =

Caleb Liang=

National Chung-Cheng Univers= ity

Abrstract

In “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge” Don= ald Davidson proposes a coherence picture of knowledge in which he makes the fa= mous claim that “nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief.” In Mind and World, John McDowell criticizes Davidson’s theory for failing to make room for the connection between= our worldviews and reality and leaving the notion of content unintelligible. In this paper I try to clarify their disagreement regarding perceptual experie= nce and empirical content. I suggest that their dispute lies in the following t= wo issues: whether the rational and external constraints on empirical thought = can be treated separately, and whether an account of empirical content is theoretically prior to radical interpretation. Then I explore some possibil= ities by which their debate may be advanced. I make two moves on behalf of McDowe= ll to show how Davidson’s reply to his criticism may be found unsatisfactory. First, from a McDowellian point of view, it is not clear how Davidson’s nonconceptual notion of experience might provide reason for revising beliefs. Second, Davidson’s triangulation account of content presupposes the notion of content already.*

 

Key Words: Experience, Content, Coherentism, Davidson


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經= 驗以及理性並外在的限制

 

梁益堉

摘要

<= span style=3D'font-family:PMingLiU;mso-hansi-font-family:"Times New Roman"'> = 296;一個真理與知識= 的融貫理論 = 297;(〝A Coherence Th= eory of Truth and Knowledge〞)= 這篇文章中,戴維森= 5552;出一個關於知識的ඎ= 1;貫理論。其中,他宣&= #31281;了一個著名的命題A= 306;「除了其他信念之外= ;,沒有任何事物能做&#= 28858;持有一信念的理由z= 90;」在《心靈與世界》= (Mind and World)一書裡,邁道爾(J. McDowell)批評= 說,戴維森的理論並= 6410;合理說明我們的信ঘ= 5;與世界之間的關聯,&= #20063;使得= 839;容這個概念變得不= 可理解。本文試圖釐= 8165;這兩位哲學家關於শ= 3;官經驗和經驗內容的&= #29229;議。我將指出,他= 497;的爭執是在以下兩個= ;論題上:第一,關於&#= 32147;驗思想所需的= 702;性限制外在限制是否可以分開處= 理?第二,關於 = 147;驗內容的說明是否在理= 論上優先於戴維森的= 522;進詮釋理論?接著我將= 嘗試使他們的爭議有= 5152;進展。我將考量戴಑= 3;森對邁道爾的反駁,&= #28982;後從邁道爾的立場= 358;對戴維森的意見提出= ;兩點質疑:首先,從&#= 36993;道爾的角度,戴維Č= 62;所謂的經驗是&= 750;概念。這樣的經驗能= 否提供用以修正信念= 0340;理由,是令人存疑௚= 0;。其次,戴維森用來&= #35498;明= 839;容三角測量理論其實已經預= 設了= 839;容這個概念。

關鍵詞: 經驗,內&#= 23481;,融貫論,戴維森



Received October 14, 2002; accep= ted December 15, 2002

Proofreaders: Jeng-Guo Wang, Bing-Jie Li

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2  NCCU Philosopical Jour= nal Vol.9

 

 

 

Ex= perience and Rational External Constraint  3

 

 

 

NCCU Philosophical Journal Vol.9 (December 2002), pp.1-24

ÓDepartment of Philosophy, National Chengchi University

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