Meaning and N= ormativity in Brandom’s Inferentialism
Chris
Fraser
Department of Philos=
ophy
Abstract=
Robert Brandom contends that meaning is a nor= mative concept, in that the role of the notion of meaning or conceptual content is= to determine the correct use of words or application of concepts. Hence he proposes that = an adequate account of intentional content can be given solely in terms of normative or deontic concepts, without appeal to sem= antic notions such as truth or reference. Yet meaning clearly is not overtly normative, in the way that concepts such as ‘good’ or ‘just’ are, and statements about meaning or belief are not obviously evaluations, prescriptions, or expressions of rules. So in what s= ense is meaning normative? And given that sense, can intentional content indeed = be explained by appeal to deontic notions alone? I argue that meaning is norma= tive only in the weak, instrumental sense that it provides norms to guide speake= rs in making true assertions. The claim that meaning is normative is thus tena= ble only if supplemented by an independent account of the concept of assertion.= I then argue that Brandom’s attempt to provide such an account using on= ly normative concepts is unsuccessful, because it is unable to distinguish the norms that institute assertions from other, broader norms that apply to spe= ech acts generally. This conclusion suggests that one of the fundamental tenets= of Brandom’s inferentialism is mistaken: A purely normative metalanguage= is not suff= icient to explain meaning.
Keywords: meaning, normativity, inferentialism, Brandom, philosophy of language
意義與規&#= 31684;性在布蘭登推論主ņ= 81;中的角色
方克濤
香港中文&#=
22823;學
摘要
羅伯特．布蘭登
關鍵詞：意義、#= 215;範性、推論主義、語= ;言哲學、布蘭登