「從康德到黑格爾= 301;？

「從康德&#= 21040;黑格爾」？

—「人類精&= #31070;的實際歷史」之構= 819;的歧義

史偉民

明道管理學院通= 識教育中心

摘要

費希特「&#= 20154;類精神的實際歷史{= 01;的構想在德國觀念論= 的歷史中先後為謝林= 2312;先驗觀念論體系與= ;黑格爾在精神現象學= ;中承繼，故而論者६= 0;把精神現象學置於&#= 36027;希特此一構想與謝ĉ= 19;先驗觀念論體系的&= #33032;胳中，藉以理解精&= #31070;現象學，而預設了= 三者所處理的課題相= 1516;。然而，此一觀點ঙ= 3;略了「精神」—或是&#= 12300;意識」—一詞在德ࢴ= 3;觀念論實現「人類精&= #31070;的實際歷史」的構= 819;時所具有的歧意。依= ;其歧意，「人類精神&#= 30340;實際歷史」的構想Ö= 87;以有不同的對象。本= 文將以費希特與謝林= 0340;文本為例，說明此ߌ= 8;歧意。

關鍵字：費希特、謝林、= 黑格爾、精神、意識= 2290;^*

“From Kant to Hegel?”

—T= he Ambiguity of the Conception of “the Pragmatic History of Human Spirit”

Weimin Shi

Fichte’s conception of a pragmatic hist= ory of human spirit was adopted by Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism and Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit in the histor= y of German Idealism. Thus, the Phenomenology of Spirit is often placed by interpreters in the context of the successive realization of the conception of a pragmatic hist= ory of human spirit, while it is presupposed that Fichte, Schellling and Hegel shared a common theoretical project. Yet this approa= ch ignores that the term “spirit”—or “consciousness”—was used equivocally in the context of the realization of Fichte’s conception of a pragmatic history of human sp= irit in the German Idealism. This paper shall clarify this equivocality as it is found in some works of Fichte and Schelling

Keyword: J. G. Fichte, F. W. J. Schelling= , G. W. F Hegel, spirit, consciousness.

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